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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited Liability
Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,
vs.
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent;
JOHN E. BERRYHILL III,
Defendant-Cross Respondent; and
AMY BERRYHILL,
Defendant.
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CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District County of Ada
The Honorable Dennis E. Goff
Senior District Judge Presiding at Trial

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Daniel E. Williams
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

For Respondent-Cross Appellant

For
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CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

REPLY ARGUMENT
Berryhill repeatedly argues the jury could have concluded, notwithstanding the language
in Berryhill's handwriting, "This is a loan ... " in Exhibit 1, and despite Glenn Mosell having
written "loan" conspicuously on nine often checks that Berryhill accepted, and regardless of
Berryhill having accounted for these funds as "loans" to his company, "the parties did not intend
a loan transaction."l In the same breath, Berryhill is critical of the trial court's conclusion the
jury found there was no contract, when Berryhill argues the jury could have found a contract
existed, but then "no breach.,,2
Having now submitted two briefs, Berryhill fails to identify just what the contract was, if
it was not for a loan. Then, as even Berryhill is unable to articulate just what the contract was if
not a loan, how could the jury then have found there was "no breach" of this as yet unidentified
contract as Berryhill also contends?
I. BERRYHILL WAIVED APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE ORDER GRANTING NEW
TRIAL.
Judge Goff granted Mosell Equities' Motion for New Trial, the review of which involves
an abuse of discretion standard. Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797, 800,
134 P.3d 648,651, (2006). "Decisions within the discretion of the trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Crowley v.
Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438, (2007). However, Berryhill fails to address
I

2

Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 10.
Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 17.
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the trial court's decision on this issue in his Appellant's brief. Rule 35(a)(6), IAR. Apparently
now realizing this critical error, Berryhill finally argues in his Reply Brief the abuse of discretion
standard, and then attempts to claim he raised this argument in his first brief. "This mistake
means the court's decision on JNOV 3 and new trial motions was not rendered 'through the outer
bounds of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards' and 'through an exercise of
reason,' as required even under the more lenient standard for new trial. (cite omitted) Mosell
Equities fails to address this flaw in the court's reasoning, although Defendants raised it in
Appellant's Brief (p. 28).,,4 Upon review of the Appellant's Brief, however, it is clear Berryhill
never addressed the trial court's decision granting a new trial. Page 28 of Berryhill's Brief
contains the last portion of Berryhill's jury instruction argument and the beginning of his
argument the verdict was supported by "substantial, competent evidence," a JNOV standard.
Berryhill failed to raise any argument related to the trial court's grant of a new trial in his
first brief and therefore has waived any entitlement for appellate review on this issue. Even if
the court on appeal were to reverse Judge Goffs decision granting the JNOV, as Berryhill failed
to raise or argue Judge Goff erred when granting a new trial, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new
trial.
II. BERRYHILL ARGUES THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD.
The jury responded "no" to Special Verdict Question No.1.
Question No.1: Was there an express contact between Plaintiff Mosell Equities,
LLC and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached?

3
4

The abuse of discretion standard does not apply to the review of an order granting a JNOV.
Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 17.
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Judge Goff granted Mosell Equities' Motions for JNOV by ruling as a matter of law
Exhibit 1 was not ambiguous. Whether a contract is ambiguous, as well as the interpretation of
the unambiguous language, are questions of law; both at the trial level and on appeal, not
questions of fact. Mcdevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse Inc., 151 Idaho 280,283,255 P.3d 1166,
1169 (2011). Although Berryhill argues the "clearly erroneous" standard applies on appeal, that
standard is limited to review of questions of fact, not questions of law. Schroeder v. Partin, _
Idaho _,259 P.3d 617, 622, (2011). On appeal of questions oflaw, the appellate court
exercises free review. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 150 Idaho 308,246 P.3d
961, (2010). Consequently, on this appeal, the appellate court is free to decide whether they
believe Berryhill had provided a reasonable alternative meaning to the language in Exhibit 1,
"This is a loan ... ," or to the term "loan" which Glenn Mosell wrote conspicuously on nine of the
ten checks Berryhill accepted. If the appellate court finds the language unambiguous, it must
affirm Judge Goffs grant of a JNOV on Count 1.
Mosell Equities will acknowledge that the "clearly erroneous" standard would apply if as
Berryhill claims the jury could have found a contract, but then no breach. However, if the jury
found there was a loan, but no breach ofthe loan agreement, then that finding would be "clearly
erroneous," as the evidence was uncontested Berryhill denied there was a loan and he refused to
repay when asked. Berry concedes this issue in his Appellant's Brief at page 30.
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III. BERRYHILL MISREPRESENTS TO THE APPELLATE COURT THAT MOSELL
EQUITIES MOVED FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON ITS CONTRACT CLAIM.
Berryhill misrepresents that Mosell Equities moved for directed verdict on its breach of
contract claim. On page 27 of his Appellant's Brief, Berryhill cites to a statement by the trial
court and suggests the trial court was "denying Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on
the breach of contract count, .... ,,5 Judge Goff was actually responding to Berryhill's motion for
directed verdict raised after Mosell Equities had rested. Berryhill argued there was no contract
as a matter oflaw, to which Judge Goff was responding. Berryhill apparently is now arguing
that Judge Goff heard and considered Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on its contract
claim, which Berryhill claims Mosell Equities then again raised in its Motion for JNOV.
However, the record clearly proves otherwise. 6 (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 536, L. 19 to p. 549, L. 6.)
IV. MOSELL EQUITIES DID NOT INVITE ANY ERROR.
Berryhill's argument is premised on the erroneous contention that failure to object to a
jury instruction ipso Jacto constitutes invited error. Such a contention ignores the very definition
of "invited error."
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated recently in Taylor v. Nichols, Docket No. 36130,
(2010), "'Invited error' is '[a]n error that a party cannot complain of on appeal because the
party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the erroneous ruling.'
Black's Law Dictionary 249 (3rd pocket ed. 2006)." Based on this definition, it is hard to

Appellant's Brief, p. 27, citing to the Tr., Vol. I, p. 556, Ll. 7-13.)
Mosell Equities did move for directed verdict on Berryhill's fraud counterclaim, but not on its own breach of
contract claim.
5

6
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imagine a party can invite error when that party is following a court's prior ruling when
submitting jury instructions.
Judge Williamson denied Mosell Equities' Motion for Summary Judgment through which
Mosell Equities sought a ruling as a matter of law Exhibit 1 was unambiguous. Consequently,
because of that ruling, Mosell Equities drafted and offered jury instructions commensurate with
Judge Williamson's ruling, as Berryhill acknowledges in his brief.
MoseH Equities continues to argue that Exhibit 1 is umm1biguous, despite rulings
by both the district court and the trial court to the contrary and despite its own
failure to object to jury instructions in line with those rulings. (Appellant'S Reply
and Cross-Respondent's Brief~ p. 5.) (Emphasis added.)
Having moved for summary judgment, MoseH Equities did not "prompt" or "encourage"
any error; it specifically argued during its summary judgment motion it was error not to conclude
Exhibit 1 was unambiguous. However, having lost that argument, MoseH Equities was forced to
file jury instructions which embodied the Judge Williamson's prior ruling. Under these
circumstances, Mosell Equities' conduct hardly met the definition of invited error.
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT TO A MOTION FOR JNOV.
In his two briefs, Berryhill argues jury instruction issues (ad nauseam), when jury
instructions are irrelevant to a JNOV motion.
When ruling on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court must determine
whether, as a matter of law, the jury's verdict was supported by evidence of
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached
a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Hudson, 118 Idaho at 478, 797 P.2d at
1326 (citation omitted). This inquiry focuses the court's attention to the evidence
admitted in the case, and the court reviews the facts with deference to the
nonmoving party. Ricketts, 137 Idaho at 580,51 P.3d at 394.

Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776, 203 P.3d 702, 706 (2009). (Emphasis added)
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If the facts establish the contract at issue was unambiguous, then a court must rule as a
matter of law a contract existed, just as Judge Goff ruled. As this analysis has nothing to do with
how the jury was instructed, whether there was error in such instructions is irrelevant.
Berryhill's reliance on the Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702, (2009), is
misplaced. Unlike this case, where Mosell Equities argued the evidence in support of its motion
for JNOV, the Appellants in Bates argued error in the jury instructions "as a matter oflaw."
In the instant case, Appellants do not argue that the jury's verdict was not
supported by evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Rather,
Appellants argue that the special verdict jury instructions were incorrect as a
matter of law.

Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho at 776.
The sole reason the Supreme Court was discussing jury instructions in the context of a
motion for JNOV in Bates was because the Appellant raised that issue, which the Court
ultimately ruled was error. Bates does not however support Berryhill's contention jury
instructions are relevant when considering motions for JNOV.

VI. EXHIBIT 1 WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS.
Berryhill appears to claim that somehow Mosell Equities was equivocal in its contention
there was always loan. However, in its Complaint, (R., Vol. 1, p. 14.), and its Amended
Complaint, (R., Vol. 1, p. 94.), and throughout the proceedings, Mosell Equities maintained the
agreement was the funds would remain a loan until the transition to the buy-in occurred.
While Berryhill may cite to the correct law; "A contract term is ambiguous where there
are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical," Potlatch Educ. v.
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Potlatch School Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 663226 P.3d 1277, (2010), once again he fails to provide a
reasonable alternative interpretation of the contract where "loan" does not mean "loan." Neither
during the trial nor at any time during this appeal has Berryhill provided any reasonable
alternative interpretation for the term "loan," which he wrote on Exhibit 1 and which Glenn
Mosell wrote on nine checks that Berryhill received and accepted.
Berryhill contends that Glenn Mosell's statements, taken out of context, somehow meant
Mr. Mosell did not intend the funds to remain a loan pending the buy in. Notably, Berryhill
claims Mosell's statement, the loaned funds were an "interim substitute," is somehow an
admission the funds were not a loan. However, this designation indicates Mosell understood the
loaned fund were distinct from funds that would apply to the as yet undetermined "buy-in." The
loaned funds were an interim substitution, alkla "loan" until the parties agreed on the terms to
consummate Mosell Equities' purchase of half of Berryhill & Co., Inc. Mosell' s use of the term
"interim substitute" is consistent with his contention throughout this litigation that the funds
were and remained a loan pending the buy in, which again, no one contends ever occurred.
Moreover, such evidence is irrelevant ifthe court on appeal finds, as did Judge Goff, that
the language, "This is a loan ... " in Exhibit 1 and the term "loan" on nine of 10 checks delivered
to Berryhill was not ambiguous.
VII. BERRYHILL HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS TO SUPPORT AN
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE ON REMAND.
Berryhill fails to establish any evidence in the record that would support his equitable
estoppel defense.
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As the jury was instructed, the first element of the defense of equitable estoppel is proof
of a false statement of concealment of a material fact. (Instruction No. 20, (R., p. 1267.))
Berryhill argues Glenn Mosell somehow misrepresented his intent that the funds would
remain as a loan until such time as he and Berryhill reached an agreement on the terms of the
"buy in." "Defendant Berryhill & Company contended throughout the litigation that by insisting
on calling the funds a "loan," while simultaneously assuring Defendant they would not remain
such, Plaintiff's principle, Glenn Mosell induced Defendant to accept the funds under false
pretenses and should be estopped from enforcing any loan contract.,,7 However, once again,
Berryhill fails to identify facts to support this contention Glenn Mosell's statements were in any
manner false.
Berryhill's argument ignores the fact that Mosell Equities transferred money to Berryhill
& Co. based on Berryhill's promise of Mosell Equities' entitlement to "buy in" to his company.

Obviously, if Mosell "assured" Berryhill the funds would not remain a loan, it was based on
Berryhill's promise to deliver the promised equity ownership. In other words, it is Berryhill who
controls the status of the funds. If Berryhill performs as promised, Mosell Equities gets its
ownership interest, just as envisioned in the Meier documents. If not, the funds remain a loan,
just as Berryhill accounted for the funds on his company's financial statements.
If the parties pursued the buy in and consummated the deal when Berryhill transferred the
promised equity in his company, then clearly the loaned funds "would not remain such."
However, Berryhill never tendered any signed "buy in" documents, nor was he able to identify

7

Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 25.
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any final terms at trial. While undoubtedly the parties contemplated future agreement, it was
clear that if that agreement was never reached, the funds would remain a loan to Berryhill & Co.
No reasonable person, considering the facts of this case, could have concluded otherwise.
As Berryhill has failed to establish facts that would constitute a false statement, and if the
appellate court upholds Judge Goff's decision granting a INOV on Count 1, there is no reason
for a new trial.
VIII. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION.
Mosell Equities delivered $405,000.00 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise he was
selling equity in his restaurant business. With this money, Berryhill has created three operating
restaurants. If on appeal the reviewing court could somehow conclude the jury answered
Question No.1, "no" because they believed there was no meeting of the minds, then on what
equitable basis is Berryhill entitled to just keep $405,000.00? While the money may not be in an
account as Berryhill contends, it is available as profits from Berryhill's three restaurants.
If on appeal the reviewing court concludes the jury could have decided there was no
meeting of the minds as a basis for responding to Question No.1, then Mosell Equities
respectfully requests remand with instructions for the district court to order the contract
rescinded and order Berryhill & Co. to remit $405,000.00 to Mosell Equities.
CONCLUSION
There was a loan that the parties intended to transfer to equity if they could reach terms.
However, as Berryhill refused to sign the buy-in documents, the funds Mosell Equities provided
were and remained as a loan to Berryhill & Co.
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There was undoubtedly a breach as Berryhill refused to repay the loaned funds after he
refused to sign the buy-in documents, as Berryhill concedes on appeal.
As there was a loan contract and a breach, Mosell Equities respectfully requests the Court
affirm Judge Goffs decision granting JNOV and remand with direction the District Court enter
Judgment against Berryhill & Co. for $405,000.00. There is no need for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May, 2012.

~c~6;k
For the Respondent-Cross Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of May, 2012, I served the foregoing, by
having two true and complete copies delivered via the manner indicated to:

Daniel E. Williams
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300
P.O. Box 1776
Boise, ID 83701

Hand Delivered

ERIC R. CLARK
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